Economic Analysis of Political Institutions

POLISCI
351B
Instructors
Acharya, A. (PI)
Flores-Solano, J. (GP)
Section Number
1
Applying techniques such as information economics, games of incomplete information, sequential bargaining theory, repeated games, and rational expectations of microeconomic analysis and game theory to political behavior and institutions. Applicatoins include agenda formation in legislatures, government formation in parliamentary systems, the implications of legislative structure, elections and information aggregation, lobbying, electoral competition and interest groups, the control of bureaucracies, interest group competition, and collective choice rules.
Grading
Letter or Credit/No Credit
Units
4
Graduate
Course Tags
Design of Public Institutions
Advanced Policy Analysis
Academic Year
Quarter
Winter
Section Days
Tuesday Thursday
Start Time
9:15 AM
End Time
10:45 AM
Location
GSB Class of 1968 101